A repost from July of 2006
FFARP. Also known as the Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program. It was about a 2-week program where your squadron would go thru a series of escalating scenarios against both scripted and unscripted (but extremely wily) enemy air capabilities, ultimately ending up in numerous air combat sessions as the “war” escalates.
Dave “Doc” Hicks and I were in the middle of one of these furballs where you are up against an unknown number of bad guys. Could be you and your wingman against a similar number of bad guys (2 versus 2), or you, alone and unafraid against an unknown number of bad guys (1 versus unknown). The idea, of course, being that you never really know what to expect “out there” so you must tailor your tactics based on what you know and what you don’t know.

One of the things that aviators who must use their aircraft to the very limit of its capability learn (and this is a continuous process) is how best to fight your aircraft. This not limited, of course, to which weapon to use, but rather includes intimate knowledge of things like what the best speed is in each phase of the fight, what the capabilities are of the expected enemy aircraft, what the best turning speeds and rates are, what the max G’s are in any part of this flowing dynamic called air combat maneuvering, any number of a dozen or more factors that oftentimes determine life or death in an aerial duel.
A brief segue, if you don’t mind, and later on you will see why. There is a special place reserved in hell for cockpit design engineers who do not have a good grounding in ergonomics – that “applied science of equipment design, such as for the workplace, intended to maximize productivity by reducing operator fatigue and discomfort.”

The F-14 had a couple of what we called “dogfight radar modes”, or modes where we could command the radar to go into an automatic-lock routine where the first thing in its scan volume would get locked on. Typically, when you became engaged in a dogfight (or ACM – air combat maneuvering), the pilot might call for VSL high (or low), or Vertical Scan Lock-on, which would put the radar into a concentrated scan volume and would go to a single-target track lock on the first thing that entered into its scan.
The interesting aspect to this (and what the meat of this post is about) is that those aforementioned cockpit design engineers (I hope they are enjoying the heat and humidity where they currently reside) decided that the switch to activate VSL would be very happy on the left-hand side console, down just to the left of where my g-suit encased thigh was, and consisted of a toggle switch about an inch high. Surrounded by other toggle switches about an inch high. Needless to say, not a very easy switch to find in normal circumstances, let alone in the hectic world of a dogfight.
Yes, as you became more experienced in the management of your cockpit duties finding such seemingly obscure yet important switches and knobs and controls becomes easier, and ingenious “fixes” were thought up to assist in the usage of this particular switch – such as cutting a small 3″ piece of stiff plastic tubing to put over the switch so instead of looking down and searching for this miniscule thing, all you had to do was sweep your hand over in that direction and you’d hit that plastic extension and activate the VSL mode.
This particular plane we were in did not have such advanced technology, however, so I had to do the hunt and peck routine anytime we needed that particular ACM radar mode.
Anyhow, to make a long post shorter, Doc and I were in this one particular FFARP evolution, probably 1 v 2 (us against 2 other aircraft), and as the good, dutiful radar intercept officer, I was watching our backside (”Six is clear, Doc!”) as he was pushing the fight on one of the bad guys – meaning the other one was still out there somewhere. I just had to find him.
Doc shot the guy we were yanking with, calling “Fox 2, A-4, left-hand-turn, 12.5″ (translated: sidewinder shot on an A-4 Skyhawk in a left hand turn at 12,500 feet altitude), and I opened my scan up a bit from just the rear quadrant.
That’s when things got fun. We were probably at or close to our best cornering speed, meaning we had the best instantaneous g-available to the aircraft. Aerodynamics being what it is, speed is the all-powerful arbiter on what you can do with your plane. Too slow, and you can’t turn very fast or efficiently. Too fast and it takes the state of Texas to turn around in. We were around 400 or 450 knots, which makes the Tomcat, with its wings out at 35 degrees, a not-bad turning aircraft with a fair amount of available “oomph” to put on the plane.
Right about then, I caught sight of the other still-alive bogey, off the right side, a little high, not quite nose on to us.
It was important to get Doc’s eyes on the A-4 as soon as possible, so my call to him was short and succinct – “Right 2 o’clock, a little high!” – spoken with a fair amount of urgency and inflection (the normal dulcet tones of Pinch on the Radio gave way to an intercom call at a volume that probably did not need the intercom).
That call told Doc to get his eyes over to the right side of the aircraft, look just a bit to the right of the nose (12 o’clock being dead ahead, so 2 o’clock will be a bit right of that) and a little above the horizon.
Crew coordination is one of the things we work on incessantly in the Tomcat, and as soon as I made that call to Doc I knew exactly what he was going to do and I knew exactly what I needed to do. He was going to roll the aircraft to the right and get the lift-vector (the ideal aerodynamic position in the longitudinal plane of the jet to put the best G force on the aircraft) on the bogey and pull like crazy to get our nose on the target, and I would reach down and hit the VSL high switch to get the radar in that dogfight mode to try and get a lock.
Now you know why I touched on ergonomics. As soon as I turned my head down and to the left to find that VSL switch, Doc rolled the aircraft right and snapped a good 10 g’s on the aircraft in getting the jet moved around to face the new threat.
Which meant my head, leaning down and looking to the left side console for this idiotic little inch-high switch, instantaneously became fused with and part of my left knee.
10 g’s is 10 times normal gravity. Your neck usually supports your 8 or 10 lb head (unless you are one of those 40 lb brainiacs), so making that puppy weigh 80 or 100 lbs does nice number on the posture your mother worked so hard to instill.
Still, I managed to hit that VSL high switch, wrestled with getting my head back up into a more elevated environment (by now I was past my knee and down around my ankles, I think), and getting my eyes back into the fight.
VSL locked on, we got a good shot off and killed the second bogey rather expeditiously, and by then it was time to head back to Oceana and down the jet for overstress. And wonder if I should call a chiropractor. Doc had no problem – he was set and ready for such a maneuver, while I, even though sorta-kind more-or-less knowing what was coming, still had to look over for that damn switch.
10g is 10g no matter how you slice it and it immediately gets all your attention, but there is no way that the airplane or your bod will sustain that kind of acceleration for any appreciable length of time. (i.e. for all practical purposes, it’s an instantaneous thing.) An instananeous 10g pull on the aircraft can create some problems for the airframe (microscopic cracks, metal fatigue, etc) but the humans inside the machine couldn’t possibly hold consciousness and body in one piece for a sustained 10g’s even if wearing three g-suits (the inflatable bladders around our lower torso that inflate to help push blood back into the all-important brain-housing-unit).
The ability for the aircraft to sustain g-force is limited to speed and energy which relates directly to how much power the engine(s) have. In this particular case, the 10g’s lasted a few, perhaps 3-5 seconds as Doc snapped the nose around and pulled like crazy. When that happened, we bleed airspeed, got slower, and the “g” eased off as the aircraft assumed its new position in space. Didn’t make my back/neck/head feel any better though.
Anyhow, as I recall we didn’t get into too much trouble when we got back (overstresses are expected sometimes in this training regime – the Tomcat allowable max-g was only 6.5, so 10 was more than a tad outside the envelope – note: the manufacturer’s, Grumman, advertised “g” limit on the aircraft was higher than 6.5, but the Navy dropped it to this lower limit to extend service life on a rather pricy investment), but we did get told that if we did it again, the next flight would be without g-suits.
Incidentally, Doc and I ended up at the end of that particular FFARP program tied with 2 other aircrew on the east coast with the best kill-ratio in the business that year – a perfect 23-0 record over the 2 week “war”.
That and $2.75 gets me a cappuccino at Starbucks